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Abstract—Nowadays, providing employees with failure-free
access to various systems, applications and services is a crucial
factor for organizations’ success as disturbances potentially in-
hibit smooth workflows and thereby harm productivity. However,
it is a challenging task to assign access rights to employees’
accounts within a satisfying time frame. In addition, the manage-
ment of multiple accounts and identities can be very onerous and
time consuming for the responsible administrator and therefore
expensive for the organization. In order to meet these challenges,
firms decide to invest in introducing an Identity and Access
Management System (IAMS) that supports the organization by
using policies to assign permissions to accounts, groups, and
roles. In practice, since various versions of IAMSs exist, it is
a challenging task to decide upon introduction of an IAMS.
The following study proposes a first attempt of a decision
support model for practitioners which considers four alternatives:
Introduction of an IAMS with Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
or without and no introduction of IAMS again with or without
RBAC. To underpin the practical applicability of the proposed
model, we parametrize and operationalize it based on a real world
use case using input from an expert interview.
Keywords—Identity and Access Management; Economic Deci-
sion Making; Information Systems; Information Security Invest-
ment; Decision Theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulating access to resources, including systems and data,
is a crucial challenge - in particular for firms which house and
maintain sensitive and confidential information. According to
the Ponemon 2014 Fourth Annual Benchmark Study on Patient
Privacy & Data Security [1], malicious insiders, employee neg-
ligence, identity thieves and employee-owned mobile devices
are four of the top 10 identified security risks. Taking this
into consideration, employees’ behavior, whether intentionally
or unintentionally, poses a severe risk to information systems
and contributes to the total of 5.6$ billion annual cost of
such breaches for the surveyed U.S. health industry sector.
Organizations have already started to implement specific mea-
sures to address the problem of internal attacks: The 2014
Insider Threat Report conducted by Ovum Research [2] states
that Identity and Access Management (IAM) is one of the
concepts most widely used in organizations in order to mitigate
insider threats. Beyond their security effects, efficient IAM can
significantly contribute to cost savings within a firm. Typically,
medium to large-sized organizations manage hundreds of ap-
plications, ten-thousands of application accounts and millions
of assignments of access privileges to their respective accounts.
Hitachi, an Identity and Access Management System (IAMS)
provider, estimates that replacing an inefficient application-
centric user management by a structured state-of-the-art IAM
in a large company can lead to cost savings of up to 2,100,100$
per year [3]. Such savings can be achieved through automated
account provisioning and reduction of security administration
efforts through an IAMS. In addition, regulations such as Basel
III [4] and the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act [5] or other data
protection and industry-specific acts such as the HIPAA [6]
for the health care sector are playing an influential role for a
company’s IAM. By offering on-demand reporting of current
access rights to resources, IAM supports compliance with such
regulations.
While the advantages of IAMSs are obvious, some companies
tend to only slowly adopt IAM due to the lack of management
commitment. Executives are in favor of daily business which
is why supportive functions - such as IT security in general
- perceive strong attention only when incidents happen. The
diffusion of RBAC, which replaces the inefficient design of
ACLs, serves as an example to illustrate our point: missing
or nontransparent economic evaluations of RBAC combined
with high migration costs rarely lead to a kick off for projects
required in order to replace old-fashioned access control mod-
els. However, the advantages of RBAC are obvious: As RBAC
allows organizations to reduce access privilege assignments
by bundling the privileges and grouping accounts into the
respective roles, it enables a more efficient provisioning of
new or updated user accounts. System administrators and help-
desk clerks are notably lifted off the time-consuming work of
manually inspecting and assigning access rights.
In order to express how valuable an integration of IAMSs
or the replacement of existing access control models is, we
adopt a decision-theoretic based approach and formulate an
economic model which supports decision makers whether to
introduce an IAMS or not and whether to migrate to RBAC
or not. We quantify the benefits of security and cost savings
and take the firm’s risk preference into account. By analyzing
requirements from both research and practice, our contribution
is to develop a model which can adapt company-specific
parameters. Thereby we ensure real-world applicability of the
proposed decision model.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we
provide a brief overview of the background and related work
by reviewing the literature on IT security investments in
general and on IAM in particular. In Section III, we develop
and explain our decision support model with its components.
Section IV underpins the proposed model by instantiating it
based on a real world use case. Finally, in Section V we
conclude our paper by summarizing the key results and give
an outlook on future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Economic decisions concerning the investments of a com-
pany in an IAMS are often made in a similar context than
decisions on investments in IT security in general. Several
approaches to evaluating general IT security investments have
been proposed in the literature [7], [8], most of which are
either based on game theory or on metric development, such
as Return on Security Investment (ROSI) [9]. However, as
these models are defined on a more generic level of IT
security investments, they have to be adapted or reformu-
lated to provide adequate support for investment decisions in
IAM. As stated by [10], the proposed frameworks and IT
security investment models are not appropriate for deciding
whether or not to invest in an IAM, as they do not reflect
the wide range of potential benefits, in particular intangible
aspects and the interconnectedness of the different aspects.
Commonly used evaluation metrics for IT security investments
([9], [11]) are not easily applicable for economic decisions
on introducing IAM. According to [12], [13], IAM projects
comprise both operational and organizational aspects of the
structure of an enterprise and therefore the level of complexity
demands a broader scope. However, there are comprehensive
models on how investments in IAM should be evaluated. The
balanced scorecard based approach by [12] is one, which
does not purely depend on financial parameters, but also
includes managerial and organizational aspects. Beyond this
approach, few studies have assessed the economic return of
principal methods for managing users’ access to information
technology resources, e.g., RBAC. Both studies [14] and [15]
assess the microeconomics of the benefits of RBAC relative to
alternative access control systems. However, these approaches
are highly dependent on many input parameters and therefore
quite complex in evaluation.
Therefore, the following requirements for a decision support
model for IAM investments can be identified:
• The decision support model should not only take
into account monetary parameters, which would lead
to single-dimensional and possibly sub-optimal de-
cisions, as only an inadequate representation of the
impact of investments in IAM is processed. Therefore
organizational and managerial aspects have to be con-
sidered to take a comprehensive point of view.
• As executives tend to act in favor of daily business and
disregard supportive functions like IAM, a decision
support model has to be simple and fast in order to
refrain from burdening decision makers in their daily
workflows.
• The decision to invest in IAM depends on several fac-
tors. Therefore data collection and data quality always
play a crucial role in comprehensive IAM approaches.
Again, in order to facilitate a simple yet fast decision
support model, it is necessary to exclusively require
parameters, which are available to executive decision
makers.
We have argued that there is a need to facilitate decision
making in the domain of investments in IAM and to develop
a simple and intuitive decision model to support decision
making in the domain of investment in IAM. In order to be
not overly dependent on unavailable parameters, we apply and
TABLE I. IAMS INVESTMENT DECISIONS UNDER
UNCERTAINTY
Actions States Decision
slow smed shigh criterion
aIAM+RBAC u11 u12 u13 f(u11, u12, u13)
aIAM+ACL u21 u22 u23 f(u21, u22, u23)
anIAM+RBAC u31 u32 u33 f(u31, u32, u33)
anIAM+ACL u41 u42 u43 f(u41, u42, u43)
extend the proposed evaluation of [15]. Therefore, contrary to
extant research, the paper aims at closing the above mentioned
research gap and explicitly considers an ex-ante view on IAM
investments.
III. DECISION SUPPORT MODEL
In order to support decisions regarding the introduction
of an IAMS either with or without an RBAC implemen-
tation, we adopt a decision-theory based approach. As can
be seen in Table I, our proposed model consists of four
mutually exclusive investment actions and three uncertain
states, which correspond to different risks of attack. The rows
in the decision model depicted in Table I display the four
investment alternatives a decision maker has to decide on.
Action aIAM+RBAC and aIAM+ACL, respectively, represent
the introduction of an IAMS with the introduction of RBAC
or ACL. In contrast action anIAM+RBAC and anIAM+ACL
define investment decisions without integration of an IAMS,
again with implementation of RBAC or ACL. The columns
in our decision model display the risk factor X . In detail,
X defines the risk of attack a company wants to see itself
protected against. We divide X into three intervals:
• Low: X ≤ 30%,
• Medium: 30% < X ≤ 70%,
• High: X > 70%.
After calculating the twelve payoffs uij with i = 1, ..., 4
and j = 1, ..., 3, a decision maker can use criteria designed
for decision making under uncertainty, e.g., the Maximin
Criterion, the Minimax Regret Criterion or the Maximax
Criterion [16], [17]. The chosen criterion depends on the
firm’s risk preferences. While the Maximin criterion takes
a pessimistic or conservative risk attitude by assuming that
the worst will happen [17], the Minimax Regret Criterion
takes a sophisticated and comparative view on the decision
alternatives. It tries to find the maximum regret over all states
of nature for each decision and selects the decision alternative
that has the minimum of these regrets [17]. The Maximax
Criterion fits both an optimistic and an aggressive decision
maker. This criterion is based on the best possible scenario
exclusively [17].
In Section IV we exemplarily apply the Maximin criterion to
a fictional use case.
The payoffs for different investment decisions and risks
depend on different factors, such as cost, systems and appli-
cations of a organization. A tabular listing of all the variables
used in our model, as presented in Table III, together with an
explanation can be seen in Table II. The model is based on
the following assumptions:
• The deployment costs with RBAC integration Y1 not
only include costs for the technical installation of
the IAMS product but also organizational costs, e.g.,
for modeling the roles. All four of the startup costs
X1, X2, Y1 and Y2 are naturally dependent on the
number of employees being managed in the IAMS.
• i1 and i2, respectively, define the percentage of po-
tentially outdated or erroneously assigned access privi-
leges to roles or direct access privileges. We assume i2
to be significantly higher than i1, as suggested by [18],
because an ACL approach requires more complex
administrative efforts.
After having defined the parameters of our decision support
model, we can now devise the model itself. As indicated
in Table III, we formulate a model, which comprises four
possible actions, namely the implementation of an IAMS with
RBAC or ACL and the introduction of RBAC or ACL without
implementing an IAMS. For each of these four actions we
calculate a payoff value uij . The payoff value depends on
the model parameters we presented previously and the risk
factor X . For calculation in our formulas we always use the
upper boundary of the intervals of attack risks, in order to
act on the assumption of a worst case scenario. However, the
parameter X can be adjusted to match the decision makers
attitude towards risk. In general the payoff formulas can be
divided into three terms:
The first term of our formula contains the fixed costs X1, X2
and Y1, Y2, respectively. Exceptions are the payoff calculations
for the scenarios with no IAMS integration. As our decision
model should be particularly useful for firms which have
not yet invested in IAM, we use the status quo of no IAM
and ACL as a baseline and define the payoffs with regard
to this baseline. The status quo obviously does not have
any installation or deployment costs, but running costs for
assigning access rights. When implementing RBAC, we at
least have to include deployment costs, but still do not include
installation costs. The fixed cost part is calculated through a
sum over all installation and deployment costs.
The second term comprises the yearly costs, which are contin-
uously incurred during business operations. We consider four
standard activities in IAM and use weights and expenditures
of time presented by [15]. The four activities are presented as:
• Assigning existing privileges to new users
• Changing existing users’ privileges
• Establishing new privileges to existing users
• Terminating privileges
Each of these activities is assigned a rate, which quantifies how
often the task appears in daily business. The rate is referred to
as “Times per Employee, per Year” and its respective values for
the sum are 0.20, 0.21, 0.20 and 0.17. The second parameter
we adapt from [15], is the time necessary to complete the
task for an administrator. Divided into “Time with ACLs” and
“Time with RBAC”, we multiply these values with the costs
for the provisioning administrator. Values used for the “Time
with ACLs” parameter are 12.4, 7.8, 9.2 and 7.6. The lower
values for the “Time with RBAC” parameter are 6.9, 6.6, 8.0
and 4.7. The different coefficients result from time savings
when RBAC is implemented. All values for the IAM tasks are
scaled in minutes. The provisioning administrator’s cost unit is
given as eh . Therefore the only variable part in the products is
the number of employees and the provisioning admin’s salary.
In the calculation for our status quo we additionally multiply
each task with the number of applications d, because each
task has to be managed for each application and not only for
one IAMS. Similarly, in case of an RBAC integration we also
take into account all the applications, accumulate all users
for each application and use the coefficients depending on
whether RBAC is implemented into the specific application or
not. The second term therefore expands to four sums over all
applications d including the product of the number of accounts
per application n and the provisioning administrator’s costs
multiplied by the period of time introduced above depending
on whether RBAC is implemented or not, which is represented
by rn.
The last term of our formula includes measures for the risk
preference of the firm. Therefore, we add the product of the
the risk of attack factor X , the number of access privileges
h and the cost in case of a security incident k. In case of
an IAMS implementation we additionally include i1 and i2
respectively, to account for the rate of erroneous assignments
of access privileges to roles or to concrete user accounts. We
will show typical examples of these rates in the application of
our use case in the next Section.
IV. USE CASE
An use case has been carried out to explore the feasibility
of the approach to providing strategic decision support for
IAMS investments. To determine the necessary parameters for
our decision model, we conducted an expert interview to gain
practical information from real-world examples with industry-
standard assumptions. Our exemplary company is a medium
sized enterprise employing 5,000 people and it is planning
to integrate four applications into an IAMS. The company
assigned 1,500 access privileges in total. When using an IAMS
with RBAC or without RBAC, respectively, we assume 5% or
20% of the 1,500 access privileges to be erroneously assigned,
which is consistent with the findings of previous studies [18].
We choose both license costs and deployment costs to be equal
regardless of whether RBAC is implemented or not. Therefore,
we assume license costs of 50,000e and deployment costs of
100,000e. For the administrator, who maintains the IAMS, we
include the typical hourly wage of 45e. In case of a security
incident regarding the IAMS, we estimate the attack costs to be
200,000e. Furthermore, our evaluation is based on an discount
rate of 2%.
Using this fictional company we compute the following overall
costs of our four possibly actions in the context of the three
previously shown environmental states of assumed risk of
attack factors of 30%, 70% and 100%. The results are depicted
in Table IV.
After calculating the payoff table, we now use the Maximin
criterion as a simple but effective criterion for decision making
under uncertainty. This criterion is based on the worst-case
scenario of each action. It fits both pessimistic and conservative
decision makers. With regard to its computation, the Maximin
criterion chooses the action that maximizes the minimum out-
TABLE II. MODEL PARAMETERS
Symbol Parameter Explanation
X1 License fees for an IAMS with RBAC This parameter takes into account the initial license costs of an IAMS.
Industry experience shows that the licensing schemes of a majority of
commercial IAMS are based on the number of managed identities. Prices
vary from 10-25e per identity.
X2 License fees for an IAMS without
RBAC
This parameter is equal to X1, except that it takes into account the initial
license costs of an IAMS without RBAC integration.
Y1 Deployment costs for an IAMS with
RBAC
This parameter includes all costs in conjunction with the installation of
the IAMS. The fees depend on the number of employees, roles and
applications.
Y2 Deployment costs for an IAMS with-
out RBAC
Almost identical to Y1, this parameter represents deployment costs of an
IAMS without RBAC integration.
c Number of employees c stands for the number of employees, whose identities will be managed
by the IAMS.
a Provisioning administrator costs This parameter defines the hourly costs of the administrator, who performs
the identity management operations within the company.
h Number of access privileges The parameter h characterizes the number of access privileges. h is
necessary for both RBAC and ACL approaches, because the security
incident severity is dependent on the number of access privileges being
affected.
j Discount rate The discount rate j refers to the interest rate used in discounted cash
flow analysis to determine the present value of future cash flows in our
decision model.
k Estimated cost in case of a security
incident
k takes into account the cost that are incurred by an insider attack.
i1 Rate of erroneously assigned access
privileges to roles
This parameter defines the rate of access privileges of the IAMS with
RBAC, which have been assigned to their respective users incorrectly.
i2 Rate of erroneously assigned direct ac-
cess privileges
This parameter is equal to i1, except that it shows the rate of erroneously
assigned privileges on an ACL basis.
d Number of applications The parameter d includes the number of applications, which will be
integrated into the IAMS. Each of these applications will be described
in more detail with the next two variables.
en Number of accounts per application n en describes for each application n the number of accounts, which are
actively using the application. As mentioned earlier, we assume en to be
equal to c for most of the applications, which will be integrated into an
IAMS.
rn Application support for application-
specific RBAC
This last parameter is a binary variable and defines whether the application
n supports RBAC or not.
come for every action. Therefore, we focus on the last column
of our payoff table (Table IV), which represents the worst
possible scenario with the highest rates of security incidents
occurring. A decision maker with a pessimistic or conservative
risk preference would make the investment decision based on
the worst case scenarios with the highest risk of attack factor
X for all four possible actions. Obviously, the highest risk
of attack factor is associated with the highest costs of all
three states. Out of these four available actions, a decision
maker adopting the Maximin criterion would now opt for the
integration of an IAMS with the implementation of RBAC,
because this action would generate costs of approximately 16.1
million e, which is the least cost of all four actions.
V. CONCLUSION
The introduction of an IAMS is a complex task, as it
has numerous impacts on the operational and organizational
structure of an organization. Therefore an analysis of the rel-
evant aspects has to be taken into account in a comprehensive
decision support model. With regard to the available data
and a focus on simple and fast calculation, our approach can
serve as an orientation rather than a complete decision support
model. Although our model includes only parameters, which
are available in most cases, the decision maker has to have a
clear understanding of these variables and what they imply in
the context of the particular company. Our proposed model is
not suitable for every aspect of decision making in IAM. Since
it does only include the provisioning aspects of an investment
decision in the field of IAM, we aimed at fast and real-world
applicability of the model. Another limitation of our decision
support model might be that it mainly depends on monetary
parameters, which could lead to sub-optimal results. However
we included the decision makers willingness to take on risks
and just converted it to a financial indicator in order to establish
comparability.
This paper presents a systematic decision support framework
for the introduction of IAMS into organizations. We formu-
lated a decision theory based approach working with typically
available model parameters. Therefore we first quantified the
TABLE III. DECISION SUPPORT MODEL
Actions Cost (depending on X = 30, 70, 100)
with IAMS RBAC X1+Y1+
1
j [0.2·c·6.9· a60+0.21·c·6.6· a60+0.2·c·8· a60+0.17·c·4.7· a60 ]+X ·h·i1 ·k = u1p, p = 1, 2, 3
ACL X2+Y2+ 1j [0.2·c·12.4· a60+0.21·c·7.8· a60+0.2·c·9.2· a60+0.17·c·7.6· a60 ]+X·h·i2·k = u2p, p = 1, 2, 3




n=1 (en · a60 ((12.4− 6.9)rn + 6.9))+0.21
∑d
n=1 (en · a60 ((7.8− 6.6)rn + 6.6))+
0.2
∑d
n=1 (en · a60 ((9.2− 8.0)rn + 8.0))+0.17
∑d
n=1 (en · a60 ((7.6− 4.7)rn + 4.7))]+X ·h ·k =
u3p, p = 1, 2, 3
ACL 0+0+ 1j [0.2 ·c ·d ·12.4 · a60 +0.21 ·c ·d ·7.8 · a60 +0.2 ·c ·d ·9.2 · a60 +0.17 ·c ·d ·7.6 · a60 ]+X ·h ·k =
u4p, p = 1, 2, 3
TABLE IV. USE CASE RESULTS
States
Actions X=30 X=70 X=100 Maximin Criterion
with IAMS RBAC 5.6m e 11.6m e 16.1m e min(-5.6m e, -11.6m e, -16.1m e)=-16.1m eACL 19.5m e 43.5m e 61.5m e min(-19.5m e,-43.5m e, -61.5m e)=-61.5m e
without IAMS RBAC 92.8m e 212.8m e 302.8m e min(-92.8m e, -212.8m e, -302.8m e)=-302.8m eACL 95.4m e 215.4m e 305.4m e min(-95.4m e, -215.4m e,-305.4m e)=-305.4m e
benefits of cost savings and security and we account for the
risk preference of the firm. This model has been applied in an
IAM use case involving a medium sized enterprise as a real-
world example with common assumptions from the industry.
Based on the presented research approach in Section III, the
evaluation process and the decision-theory based assessment
are a first step towards a decision support model, which is
applicable to real-world IAMS investment decisions. However,
future work is needed to extend the work presented here.
We will evaluate different parameters, which work on a more
generic level than the ones used in the current model. Nev-
ertheless these new parameters have to fulfill the requirement
of being easily applicable for the decision maker. With regard
to our model, we will extend on the method how we integrate
the risk factor into our calculation and evaluate more advanced
approaches on how to measure the risk of attack. We also
intend to implement the presented model into a prototypic
software-based decision support system. The framework will
allow decision makers to understand positive and negative
impacts of the different input parameters when introducing
IAM technologies into an organization.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The research leading to these results was supported
by “Bavarian State Ministry of Education, Science and
the Arts as part of the FORSEC research association
(http://www.bayforsec.de/) and by the “Regionale Wet-
tbewerbsfa¨higkeit und Bescha¨ftigung”, Bayern, 2007-2013
(EFRE) as part of the SECBIT project (http://www.secbit.de).
REFERENCES
[1] Ponemon, “Fourth Annual Benchmark Study on Patient Privacy & Data
Security,” Ponemon Institute, Tech. Rep., 2014.
[2] O. Research, “2014 Vormetric Insider Threat Report (European Edi-
tion),” Ovum Research, Tech. Rep., 2014.
[3] Hitachi, “Example Savings Calculation - Hitachi ID Identity Manager,”
http://hitachi-id.com/identity-manager/savings/example.html - retrieved
on 19-05-2015, 2015.
[4] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III - A Global
Regulatory Framework for more Resilient Banks and Banking Systems,”
Bank for International Settlements, Tech. Rep., 2011.
[5] United States Code, “Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” July 2002.
[6] U. D. of Health & Human Services, “Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996,” 1996.
[7] H. Cavusoglu, S. Raghunathan, and W. T. Yue, “Decision-Theoretic
and Game-Theoretic Approaches to IT Security Investment,” Journal of
Management Information Systems, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 281–304, 2008.
[8] L. A. Gordon and M. P. Loeb, “The Economics of Information Security
Investment,” ACM Transactions on Information and System Security,
vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 438–457, 2002.
[9] W. Sonnenreich, J. Albanese, and B. Stout, “Return on Security Invest-
ment (ROSI) - A Practical Quantitative Model,” Journal of Research and
Practice in Information Technology, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 45–56, 2006.
[10] D. Royer and M. Meints, “Enterprise Identity Management - Towards
a Decision Support Framework based on the Balanced Scorecard
Approach,” Business & Information Systems Engineering, vol. 1, no. 3,
pp. 245–253, 2009.
[11] J. vom Brocke, G. Strauch, and C. Buddendick, “Return on Security
Investments. Towards a Methodological Foundation of Measurement
Systems,” in Proceedings of the 13th Americas Conference on Infor-
mation Systems (AMCIS 2007), 2007.
[12] D. Royer, “Assessing the Value of Enterprise Identity Management
(EIdM) - Towards a Generic Evaluation Approach,” in Proceedings
of the 3rd International Conference on Availability, Reliability and
Security (ARES 2008), 2008, pp. 779–786.
[13] ——, “Enterprise identity management–whats in it for organisations,”
Proceedings of the IFIP/FIDIS summer school on The future of identity
in the information society, pp. 403–416, 2008.
[14] G. Tassey, M. P. Gallaher, A. C. O’Connor, and B. Kropp, “The
Economic Impact of Role-based Access Control,” National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, Tech. Rep.
07007.012, 2002.
[15] A. C. O’Connor and R. J. Loomis, “2010 Economic Analysis of Role-
Based Access Control,” National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, Tech. Rep. 0211876, 2010.
[16] G. Perakis and G. Roels, “Regret in the Newsvendor Model with Partial
Information,” Operations Research, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 188–203, 2008.
[17] R. Smith and B. Slenning, “Decision Analysis: Dealing with Uncer-
tainty in Diagnostic Testing,” Preventive Veterinary Medicine, vol. 45,
no. 1, pp. 139–162, 2000.
[18] L. Fuchs, M. Kunz, and G. Pernul, “Role Model Optimization For
Secure Role-based Identity Management,” in Proceedings of the 22nd
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 2014), 2014.
